Following over a year of rising tensions in the region since Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions on Iran, Iran-sponsored militias raided the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. Shortly after that, the U.S. took out one of Iran’s most powerful military leaders, Qassim Suleimani.
Iranian leaders loudly promised vengeance, but instead seemed to offer an off-ramp, striking two nearly empty military bases in Iraq, causing no casualties. In the midst of these rapid-fire developments, a draft letter announcing the U.S.’ withdrawal from Iraq was released and the legal justifications for killing Suleimani have withered under scrutiny.
Trump has announced he will impose even more sanctions on Iran, but said at the same time that “The United States is ready to embrace peace with all who seek it.”
Although a war has been averted for the time being, the stage is set for another confrontation in the near-future if neither side changes its posture.
Two factors contributed to the rising escalation with Iran, both of which are persistent features in U.S. policy-making and have virtually nothing to do with Trump’s knee-jerk reactionary style as a president.
First, the Washington D.C. policy consensus on Iran has been largely based off influential figures with a shaky set of credentials on the Persian nation and a heavy-handed repertoire of policy recommendations.
the changing nature of warfare is simultaneously making tension flare-ups easier to escalate but harder to control: as drones and cyber technology advance, the number of ways both sides could respond militarily without engaging in a conventional war increases.
Second, the changing nature of warfare is simultaneously making tension flare-ups easier to escalate but harder to control: as drones and cyber technology advance, the number of ways both sides could respond militarily without engaging in a conventional war increases.
It is too easy to pin the blame on Trump as a particularly poor executor of foreign policy.
Beneath the surface of each of his missteps on Iran so far has been a chorus of self-anointed Middle East and Central Asia experts cherry-picked to reaffirm the importance of a military standoff with Iran, and an ever-expanding arsenal of nonconventional tools to realize that aim.
Trump’s departure from the White House may not make a difference if the next president has access the same resources available to Trump and the military.
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A Chorus of Self-Anointed Iran Experts
A funeral procession for Gen. Suleimani (AFP/FILE)
One of the biggest reasons powerful empires entangle themselves in intractable wars abroad is that they underestimate the ability of the enemy to engage in a conflict and overestimate their own ability to decisively win one.
The U.S. has spent decades seeking a knockout punch in Iraq and Afghanistan. With each conflict, influential policy makers were present to ensure to both the American people the president that the U.S. will only need to engage in a single show of overwhelming force, pin the enemy down and then force an amicable peace deal.
military leaders overseeing the war effort in Afghanistan privately realized they could not win the war, but publicly insisted that victory with both achievable and imminent. The same happened in Vietnam.
In both cases, it was a lie borne partially of self-delusion and overconfidence. On Dec 9, an investigative report found that military leaders overseeing the war effort in Afghanistan privately realized they could not win the war, but publicly insisted that victory with both achievable and imminent. The same happened in Vietnam.
On top of that, analysts on the Middle East base their thinking off faulty misrepresentations of the culture they declare themselves experts on.
“Say anything nuanced about Iran, and you are immediately [accused of being] a mouthpiece for the Ayatollahs."
A recent ethnographic study of Washington D.C.’s field of ‘Iran experts’ found that less than half of them speak Persian or have visited the country. Only about one-third of them have PhDs and far fewer focused on Iran in their studies.
A stubborn militarism pervading the halls of think tanks, media outlets, research centers and government departments simultaneously silence experts with locally informed, nuanced knowledge of Iran to be “‘too esoteric,” or worse, vilified as “regime apologists,’” while platforming those self-anointed experts who reaffirm the stance held by those in power, creating an echo chamber that bolsters the profile of loud Iran alarmists.
“Say anything nuanced about Iran, and you are immediately [accused of being] a mouthpiece for the Ayatollahs,” one Iranian-American expert said, illustrating a stark environment.
Another contributing factor is that many of D.C.’s leading think tanks are funded by explicitly anti-Iranian governments including the U.A.E., creating a chilling effect among experts who fear dissenting from their powerful donors’ official stance on Iran too forcefully.
“Say anything nuanced about Iran, and you are immediately [accused of being] a mouthpiece for the Ayatollahs,” one Iranian-American expert said, illustrating a stark environment.
In this climate, misrepresentations of Iran run rampant, as does an over-emphasis on militarist responses to the country’s geopolitical aims.
Here it is imperative to remember that Trump reportedly picked the option of killing Suleimani from a list of actions prepared for him by military officials, who may have considered the option harsh but still thought it valuable to include it nonetheless. Even without him, that option would have still likely been in the cards.
A first obvious step would be to the U.S. to re-enter the nuclear deal with Iran, but that still leaves long-term issues on the way influential experts and military minds relate to Iran untouched.
An Outdated Understanding of War
In the aftermath of the Suleimani killing, Trump tweeted: “Iran never won a war, but never lost a negotiation!” Implying that the only successful way to deal with the country is to engage it militarily rather than diplomatically.
Iran never won a war, but never lost a negotiation!
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) January 3, 2020
Though many feared Trump would drag the U.S. into a direct, conventional war with Iran, it appears by all counts the U.S. is already engaged in a low-level conflict with the country enacted mostly through proxies in Yemen and unconventional methods including sanctions.
At the same time, both sides have begun relying on remote controlled, unmanned drones to engage militarily against one another. In the fall of 2019, two Saudi oil facilities were hit by drones in an attack claimed by Iran-supplied Houthi rebels. In the summer, a U.S. drone hovering over Iranian territory was downed, which itself nearly sparked a regional conflict. And now, a drone was used to take out Suleimani.
As instruments of warfare, drones lower the costs of engagement while still providing the ability to strike with some amount of precision. In fact, they are so effective that they have become the U.S.’ primary way to engage in shadow wars in dozens of locations across Africa and the Middle East.
What the continual Iran-US standoff proves is that drones may be consequently making conflicts easier to be involved in.
What the continual Iran-US standoff proves is that drones may be consequently making conflicts easier to be involved in.
These two phenomena are making a drawn-out conflict with Iran more likely, even as tensions appear to be waning in the short-term.
Without a serious rethinking of the D.C. policy establishment ‘blob’ or of the rise in military tech; both of which make conflict appear as an attractive option rather than last resort, the U.S. and Iran may be stuck in a cycle of rising and waning conflict with no real end in sight.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of Al Bawaba News.
