Dr. Gil Feiler
The question of whether Lebanon can disarm Hezbollah and prevent attacks against Israel has moved from a theoretical debate to a strategic issue shaping the country’s future. The regional environment is changing rapidly. Iran’s network of proxy forces is under growing pressure, the Assad regime in Syria has significantly weakened, and several Arab states have already normalized relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords. In this evolving geopolitical landscape, Lebanon faces a historic choice between continuing to function as a battlefield for regional conflicts or reasserting sovereignty and integrating into the emerging Middle Eastern economic order.
The Changing Balance of Power
For nearly four decades, Hezbollah has been the dominant military force in Lebanon. Supported by Iran and entrenched in the country’s Shiite community, the organization developed a large arsenal of rockets and missiles aimed at Israel while simultaneously operating as a political party within the Lebanese system.
However, the strategic balance that enabled Hezbollah’s dominance is gradually eroding. Iran’s ability to project power through its regional proxies has weakened due to economic pressure, internal challenges, and sustained military confrontation with Israel. At the same time, the Syrian arena—once Hezbollah’s logistical backbone—has become far less reliable following the significant decline of the Assad regime’s authority.
These changes reduce Hezbollah’s strategic depth and complicate its long-term military posture. While the organization remains powerful, the cost of maintaining an independent armed force inside Lebanon is becoming increasingly high both economically and politically.
Lebanon’s Sovereignty Dilemma
The Lebanese state has long declared that all weapons should ultimately fall under government authority. This principle is embedded in international resolutions such as the United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for the disarmament of militias in Lebanon. In practice, however, successive governments have lacked the political strength to implement this policy.
Yet the domestic debate in Lebanon is slowly shifting. The country’s severe economic collapse has fundamentally altered public priorities. Large segments of Lebanese society increasingly question the logic of maintaining a permanent military confrontation with Israel while the national economy struggles with debt, unemployment, and failing infrastructure.
In this context, the realistic scenario is not an immediate forced disarmament of Hezbollah, but a gradual process in which the Lebanese Armed Forces expand their authority, particularly in southern Lebanon. Under international supervision and with external economic support, Hezbollah’s military activities could be progressively restricted, especially near the Israeli border.
Such a process would likely involve political negotiations rather than direct confrontation. Hezbollah could maintain its political role while slowly integrating elements of its military structure into state institutions.
Preventing Attacks on Israel
If the Lebanese government successfully strengthens state authority in southern Lebanon, the probability of cross-border attacks against Israel would significantly decrease. The deployment of the Lebanese army along the border, combined with international monitoring mechanisms, could create a more stable security framework.
A reduction in hostilities would benefit both sides. For Israel, it would reduce the constant risk of escalation along its northern frontier. For Lebanon, it would open the door to economic recovery and international investment.
The Abraham Accords Opportunity
The broader regional transformation created by the Abraham Accords is central to Lebanon’s strategic future. The normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab states—including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan—have demonstrated that pragmatic cooperation can replace decades of hostility.
For Lebanon, joining this framework could produce substantial economic benefits. The country could gain access to regional trade networks, tourism flows, and investment capital from Gulf states seeking stable partnerships with Israel and its neighbors. Cooperation in areas such as energy, agriculture, and technology could play a critical role in rebuilding Lebanon’s shattered economy.
However, significant obstacles remain. Hezbollah’s ideological opposition to normalization with Israel remains the most important barrier. Additionally, parts of the Lebanese political establishment continue to link normalization to progress on the Palestinian issue.
A Long-Term Strategic Shift
Despite these obstacles, the strategic logic is gradually changing. If Hezbollah’s regional support weakens further and Lebanon’s economic crisis deepens, the political incentives for compromise could grow stronger. What seems impossible today could become pragmatic tomorrow.
A realistic pathway might begin with limited security arrangements between Lebanon and Israel, followed by economic cooperation and eventually formal diplomatic normalization.
Conclusion
Lebanon stands at a historic crossroads. Continuing the current trajectory risks further economic collapse and political instability. Alternatively, restoring full state sovereignty, limiting Hezbollah’s military autonomy, and gradually integrating into the new regional order could transform Lebanon’s future.
While Lebanon joining the Abraham Accords remains a distant possibility, the strategic trends in the Middle East suggest that the idea may no longer be purely theoretical. In a region increasingly driven by economic pragmatism rather than ideological confrontation, Lebanon may eventually discover that peace and cooperation offer the most viable path toward national recovery and long-term stability.
