Fools rush in where angels fear to tread. And so it goes for Russia’s imperial overture in Syria. The shock of Russia’s deploying air power has lifted the morale of the Syrian regime and its allies, proclaiming a new era of Russian dominance.
But their euphoria will be short-lived. A closer examination reveals that the Russian lack of numbers and firepower does not substantiate the grandiose political expectations. The deployment may enhance Russia’s image and increase its leverage in any upcoming political process, but is also far from what is required to reassert the Syrian regime’s influence over all of Syria. Paradoxically as the dust settles the intervention may reveal the limitations of Russian hardware and power.
For many years the Russian military suffered from rapid decay in terms of materiel and personnel, until six years ago when the restructuring and modernization of the air force received particular attention. The Syrian conflict caught the Russian military in the midst of this process. Older aircraft like the MiG-21, -23, -25 and -27 have been withdrawn from service, with small numbers of the older MiG-29s still operational. The bulk of the fighter force is currently composed of four variants of the Sukhoi-27, including the latest bomber version, the Sukhoi-34.
The Russian contingent in Syria is composed of six MiG-31 high-altitude interceptors based in Damascus and four Sukhoi-30 fighters in Latakia. These are clearly designed to block any plans by the United States and Turkey to impose a no-fly zone in northern Syria and have no direct impact on the ground war.
Of more interest is the deployment of the Sukhoi-34, of which the Russian air force has about 60 in service. The six aircraft in Syria provide a long-range capability for delivering GPS-guided munitions, a first for the Russian Air Force. YouTube videos released by the Russian Defense Ministry show a Sukhoi-34 deploying KAB500s precision guided munitions (PGM) over Syria. However, the Sukhoi-34 is a newly acquired aircraft and the availability rate of 70 percent may have an impact on sustaining a high sortie rate. In other words perhaps no more than four aircraft may be available at any one time.
The bomber force also includes a squadron of 12 older Sukhoi-24s. The average age of these aircraft is over 25 years. Only two squadrons have been upgraded as these are being replaced by the Sukhoi-34. The Sukhoi-24 has the worst safety record in the Russian Air Force and is labor intensive to maintain. The Syrian Air Force had 20 similarly updated aircraft at the beginning of the war and two were shot down – one by the rebels and another after straying 800 meters into Israeli airspace. The Sukhoi-24 relies on a French third-generation laser targeting pod produced by Thales for accurate bombing. In essence, however, the Sukhoi-24 is an aging aircraft on its way out of service.
As for tactical ground support the story is no better with the old Sukhoi-25s. The 12 aircraft deployed in Syria appear to be the upgraded model, which has four pylons instead of five. The performance of the aircraft in the Georgia war was not encouraging. Restricted to day operations and with limited self-defense capabilities it fell prey to anti-aircraft defenses.
More recently in Iraq, the Sukhoi-25 was quickly rushed to bolster the Iraqi air force against ISIS. The force was plagued by a high attrition rate due to accidents and anti-aircraft fire. The aircraft lacked the all-weather night and day capability, as well as the endurance, of the robust propeller-driven Cessna 208, which is also used by the Iraqis and that can monitor and destroy targets both night and day.
Nothing in the Russian arsenal is comparable to the U.S. Hellfire missile, suitable for tackling fast-moving targets out of anti-aircraft fire range. No wonder then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki called for the immediate supply of Hellfire missiles last summer to confront the advancing combatants of ISIS. The Russian aircraft were all built in the 1980s and have an average age of 27 years. Though upgraded, almost none are capable of delivering GPS guided bombs. It is unlikely the Sukhoi-25 will succeed in Syria after a dismal performance in Iraq.
The situation is not any better in the realm of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, mostly conducted by unmanned aerial vehicles. The Russian aerospace industry lags behind in unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs. There are no high- or medium-level long-endurance vehicles produced in Russia. The Russians had to resort to Israeli Aircraft Industries to locally assemble the Heron UAV. The lack of long-endurance UAVs severely hampers efforts to have real-time information in all-weather conditions to be able to intervene on the spot. This shortcoming cannot be rectified by the single Ilyushin-20M electronic intelligence aircraft the Russians dispatched to Syria.
To put things in perspective, the Russian force deployed in Syria pales in comparison with the firepower of any of the U.S. Navy’s Nimitz class carriers. Six Sukhoi-34, 12 Sukhoi-24, and 12 Sukhoi-25 are no match for four squadrons of Super Hornets.
In fact, were the Russians to have anything close to the USS Nimitz they would not have needed a base in Tartous. The Russians’ sole aircraft carrier is the ineffectual Admiral Kuznetsov. The aging, vulnerable Sukhoi-33 deployed by the carrier do not offer any meaningful tactical air support.
The cruise-missile mishap – when Russia launched from the Caspian Sea, and four out of the 24 missiles fired at Syria reportedly landed in Iran – was another reminder of the technical limitations of the Russian military industry. The Russian deployment in Syria may have bolstered Russia’s image as a powerful and reliable ally, however, it is unlikely that the scale of the involvement is going to have a significant impact on the ground. The recent heavy losses of Syrian armor from TOW anti-tank missiles after days of Russian bombing in Idlib province did not bode well for the Russians. The same rationale that air power can be decisive was refuted by none other than Hezbollah against the Israelis in 2006.
The euphoria of the “axis of the resistance” may be short-lived as the dust settles and the little shock and awe produced dissipates. It is doubtful that there will be new customers for any of the Russian hardware currently advertised in the Syrian war.
Nevertheless, the Russians have indeed guaranteed themselves the best seat in any eventual political settlement, but at the expense of antagonizing the Sunni world. What the Russian campaign may spark is an escalation of the proxy war, in which the opposition will soon be sent MANPADS, or portable air-defense systems. And should the Russian efforts fail it will likely make a political solution impossible.
By Basem Shabb
